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Abstract
This paper studies how successive generations of laboratory societies organize themselves when
given reports of financial transactions from previous generations. We define an increase in
societal organization as a reduction in the entropy of the distribution of amounts sent and
returned by successive generations of players in the Investment Game. Our entropy analysis of
data from Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K. (1995. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.
Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142) indicate that the provision of a financial history
reduced the entropy of the amounts sent by Investors, amounts returned by Stewards, and the
amounts in the joint Investor/Steward distribution. We then gathered new data over five societal
generations to test the predictive power of our hypothesis that financial histories provide a basis
for developing societal order. Participants in Session I (the first generation) received no financial
history, whereas participants in the subsequent Sessions II-V received a report that summarized
the financial history of the immediately preceding session. The amounts sent by Investors and
returned by Stewards increased over the five sessions and produced greater overall societal
wealth, but entropy declined significantly only in the amounts sent by Investors. The concluding
section discusses the implications of our results and identifies opportunities for future research.
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The Impact of Financial Histories on Individuals and Societies:
A Laboratory Study
Despite the proliferation of measurement and reporting practices, little is known about
their impact on society at large. The purpose of this paper is to document how a prevalent public
disclosure practice, the reporting of financial history, influences how laboratory societies
organize themselves over time. We develop the idea that individuals and organizations may use
information not only to draw inferences, but also to restructure their environment. In particular,
we hypothesize that successive generations of individuals in laboratory societies will
increasingly organize themselves over time when they receive reports of financial transactions
undertaken by the preceding generation.
Theories of how communication influences how societies organize themselves (e.g.,
Giddens, 1984; Habermas, 1979; Luhmann, 1986; Leydesdorff, 2001) provide a basis for our
hypothesis. In these theories, societal organization is an emergent property of the norm-governed
behavior of individual actors, and can be mediated through various coordination and
communications systems. For example, information systems that aggregate and report the actions
of individuals from a preceding generation can help organize the actions of individuals in a
successive generation if individuals interpret the information as an indicator of the expected
behavioral norms in their society. In this manner, the information resources that individuals use
to produce and reproduce their social systems are the product of social interaction among
individuals in preceding generations (cf. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995, pp. 132-133;
Giddens, 1984; Latour, 1993).
We operationally define an increase in organization as a reduction in the entropy
(disorder or variance) in the amounts invested and returned by Investors and Stewards across
successive generations of players in an Investment Game setting. In an Investment Game, an
2

Investor receives $10 from the experimenter and then decides how much of the $10 ($0-$10) to
send to the Steward. The amount sent to the Steward then triples ($0-$30). Finally, the Steward
decides how much of the tripled sum to send back to the Investor. In our experiment, each
societal generation consists of a new set of Investor/Steward pairs. Following Berg et al. (1995),
we introduce financial history by providing each successive generation with a summary of the
amounts invested and returned by players in the preceding generation. Unlike Berg et al. (1995),
we introduce the Shannon-Weaver measure of entropy to assess whether the introduction of
financial transaction history reduces entropy in the distribution of amounts invested and returned
across generations of players. This entropy measure provides a formal way to assess the overall
amount of order or dispersion in societal outcomes.
The relatively simple and widely used Investment Game setting has several attractive
features for investigating the evolution of societal organization. The game is played only once,
Investors and Stewards are anonymously paired, and anonymity ensures that the experimenter
cannot match the identities of specific individuals to the dollar amounts sent and returned. These
procedures control for alternative explanations of behavior including repeated game reputation
effects, contractual precommitments, punishment threats, and experimenter demand effects. In
addition, in the Investment Game and its numerous variations (e.g., the gift exchange game, the
peasant-dictator game, and the moonlighting game), many players invest and return nonzero
amounts, contrary to the assumption of pure monetary self-interest (Berg et al., 1995; Camerer
and Fehr, 2002; Dickhaut and McCabe, 1997; Dickhaut and Rustichini, 2002). Finally, in the
Investment Game setting, substantial variation exists across the actions of different players. We
hypothesize that the introduction of financial transaction histories will reduce this variation by
mediating what individuals expect of others and what others expect of them, and that over
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successive generations of laboratory societies the actions of individuals will on average converge
toward the emerging norms of expected behavior.
Our study contributes to the prior investment game literature in three ways. First, it
applies our entropy metric to the Berg et al. (1995) data. Second, it attempts to replicate the
entropy results in a new and independent study. Third, it ascertains whether the introduction of
financial history has an incremental effect across multiple generations of the investment game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the
Investment Game, develops our measure of entropy, and states our hypotheses. The second and
third sections present the experiment’s method and results, respectively. The fourth section
discusses the implications of our results and identifies opportunities for future research.

Theory and Hypotheses
Below we describe the Investment Game and develop our hypotheses about entropy
reduction and societal organization.
Investment Game Structure
The investment game is played as follows. In stage one, the subjects in Rooms A and B
are each given $10 as a show-up fee. Subjects in Room A (Investors) are given an additional
$101 and must decide how much of their $10 to send to an anonymous counterpart in Room B.
We denote this amount by Ma. The amount sent is then tripled, resulting in a total return of 3Ma.
In stage two, a counterpart in Room B (the Steward) is given the tripled money. The counterpart
Steward must decide how much money to return, which is denoted kb(3Ma). The Investor
chooses the strategy Ma in {0, 1, 2…, 10}, while the Steward chooses the strategy
kb: {0, 3, …, 30)  {0, 1, …, 30},
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which satisfies 0 ≤ kb(3Ma) ≤ 3Ma.
These strategies result in the payoffs
Pa(Ma, kb) = $10 – Ma + kb(3Ma)
and
Pb(Ma, kb) = 3Ma - kb(3Ma).
A subject’s initial wealth is denoted Wi. If subjects have strictly increasing indirect utility
function for wealth, given by Vi(Wi + Pi(Ma, kb)) for i = a, b, and each subject, i, maximizes Vi(⋅),
then Stewards have a dominant strategy to keep all the money, that is, kb(3Ma) = 0 for all Ma. If
Investors infer their counterpart’s dominant strategy, then they should send nothing, i.e., Ma = 0.
If these results obtain, societal entropy will already be zero or close to zero, even in the absence
of information about the actions of individuals in a preceding laboratory society.
Hypotheses
One hypothesis for the investment game is that subjects will make decisions consistent
with the subgame perfect prediction,
N0: Ma = 0

for all a.

If for some reason Investors send a positive amount (i.e., Ma > 0), then the dominant strategy for
Stewards is as follows:
N1: If Ma > 0, then kb(3Ma) = 0 for all b.
Past research in the Investment Game has found, however, that some investors trust stewards and
that some stewards are trustworthy. Consistent with these prior results, our hypotheses for the No
History condition (first generation of players) in our Investment Game are as follows:
H1. Investors will send nonzero amounts to Stewards (Ma > 0 for some a).
H2. Stewards who receive nonzero amounts will return nonzero amounts to Investors
(kb(3Ma) > 0 for some b).
5

Impact of financial history. The question next arises as to how much variation exists
across individual behavior, and whether a simple information system that merely aggregates and
reports the actions of individuals from a previous generation will reduce that variation in a
successive generation. To address this question, our experimental design employs multiple
generations of players. All generations except the first receive a financial history of transactions
made by the immediately preceding generation. Sociological research suggests that
communication across generations can significantly influence behavior in subsequent
generations (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Habermas, 1979; Luhmann, 1986; Leydesdorff, 2001). In our
setting, a financial history summarizing the transactions of a preceding generation provides a
basis for individuals to assess the dispositions, intentions, and trustworthiness of players in a
subsequent Investment Game (cf. Kramer, 1999, p. 575). For example, Investors might use the
past transaction data to identify investments that are likely to yield a positive return, and
Stewards might infer the reasonableness of the amount invested by their Investor partners as well
as the amount they are expected to return to the Investors. Alternatively, Investors and Stewards
might more simply select amounts based on their conformity with perceived central tendencies in
the past data.
Using entropy to measure the impact of financial history. To assess the impact of
financial history on players’ behavior, we measure the change in entropy of the amounts invested
and returned by Investors and Stewards. The term entropy first arose in statistical mechanics to
reflect the status of a particle system. Decreases in entropy reflect less movement in the particle
and less uncertainty about its location. In a social setting, the amount of entropy reflects the
amount of uncertainty about individuals’ behavior. An increase in entropy means that the
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behavior of individuals is more uncertain, while a decrease in entropy means that the behavior is
less uncertain or more orderly.
The engineering and information theory literatures have widely used the entropy concept
(e.g., see Cover and Thomas, 1991). Sims (1998, 2003, 2005) introduced Shannon’s entropy
concept into economics and defined the informativeness of information signals as the change in
entropy between prior and posterior distributions. The Shannon entropy measure has since been
used to model price stickiness (Sims, 1998), flexible information acquisition (Yang, 2012), and
general equilibrium (Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009). Following the prior economics
literature, we use Shannon’s entropy to measure the uncertainty of individuals’ behavior.
More formally, we use the following entropy definition to measure the amount of order in
our laboratory societies. Let pi denote the probability of the ith element being drawn from a
distribution of n discrete outcomes. Entropy is defined by
-

Σ pi log 2( pi ).

As an example, consider a binary outcome such as the flip of a coin. A fair coin has entropy
equal to 1, and a biased coin with a 0.75 probability of heads has entropy equal to 0.81. The
entropy metric indicates that the biased coin has more order than the fair coin.2
Entropy metric applied to the Berg et al. (1995) data. To illustrate how the entropy
metric can be applied and to establish continuity with the prior literature, we now perform an
entropy analysis of the Berg et al. (1995) data. The Berg et al. (1995) study had two treatments,
“no history” and “social history.” The social history treatment included a report summarizing the
decisions in the no history treatment. Below, we re-label their “social history” treatment as
“financial history” to conform to the labels we use in our experiments. We compare the entropy
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metrics across the Berg et al. (1995) no history and financial history treatments, separately for
the investor, steward, and joint data sets.
For the Investors, EntropyNo History = 3.141 and EntropyFinancial History = 2.876. We used a
bootstrapping technique to determine whether the observed Entropy reduction of 0.265 is
statistically significant. The null hypothesis for this test is that the amounts invested were chosen
randomly. We generated 10,000 measures of differences in entropy under this assumption. Based
on this bootstrapped distribution, the observed reduction in entropy is significant (p < .02, onetailed).
Since the maximum amounts returned by stewards were constrained by the tripled
amounts sent by investors, we converted the amounts returned into percentages of the maximum
amount that could be returned. Under this measure, more trustworthy stewards returned a higher
percentage. More specifically, we analyzed the entropy in the distributions of the amounts
returned by Stewards, in deciles of percentage of amounts received from Investors. For these
Steward distributions, EntropyNo History = 3.086 and EntropyFinancial History = 2.709. We again used
a bootstrapping technique to determine whether the observed Entropy difference of 0. 377 is
statistically significant. The null hypothesis for this test is that the returned amounts were chosen
randomly. We generated 10,000 measures of differences in entropy under this assumption. Based
on this bootstrapped distribution, the observed reduction in entropy is significant (p < .0001,
one-tailed).
Finally, the Berg et al. (1995) no history and financial history data as a whole tended to
cluster on outcome pairs. We examine the joint densities of Investor and Steward behavior to test
whether the observed clustering is statistically significant. This test must take into account that
the No History condition has a smaller sample size than the Financial History condition. Ceteris
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paribus, smaller sample sizes yield smaller maximum levels of entropy.3 The entropy formula for
the No History condition is
-ΣΣ (fi,j/32) Log2 (fi,j/32)
where fi,j denotes the frequency in category “i,j.” For example, “3,2” denotes 3 dollars invested
and 2 returned by the steward. A similar formula applies to the Financial History condition, with
28 possible observations. The calculated entropies are 4.688 and 4.227 for the No History and
Financial History conditions, respectively, for an overall decrease in entropy of 0.461 across the
two conditions. To test for significance, we created 10,000 draws of the difference between
entropies under the assumption that in both settings the observations were just as likely to fall in
one category as any other. This test indicates that the 0.461 reduction in entropy is marginally
significant at the .055 level (one-tailed).
In sum, the Berg et al. (1995) data indicate that the introduction of financial history
significantly reduced entropy in the distributions of amounts sent and amounts returned, and
marginally reduced entropy in the joint distributions. The results from the Berg et al. (1995)
single-generation financial history treatment are, however, preliminary and to our knowledge
have not been replicated in subsequent studies. More specifically, our analysis of the Berg et al.
(1995) data leave two unanswered questions: (1) Can the entropy reduction results be
independently replicated in a new study? (2) Do financial histories have an incremental effect
over subsequent generations? To provide answers, we gathered new data over five societal
generations to test the predictive power of our hypothesis that financial histories provide a basis
for developing order in societies. Participants in Session I (the first generation) received no
financial history, whereas participants in Sessions II-V (the subsequent four generations)
received a report summarizing the financial history of the immediately preceding session.
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Based on our preceding discussion of social theory, and consistent with our entropy
analyses of the Berg et al. (1995) data, the following hypotheses predict that the distributions of
amounts invested, returned, and the joint distributions will exhibit more order (less entropy)
across generations of players:
H3. Financial transaction histories will produce more order (less entropy) in the Investor
distributions across generations.
H4. Financial transaction histories will produce more order (less entropy) in the Steward
distributions across generations.
H5. Financial transaction histories will produce more order (less entropy) in the joint
Investor/Steward distributions across generations.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were recruited from the subject pool in CIRANO Research Center, Montreal,
Canada. Subjects received $10 for showing up. Subjects also could earn up to an additional $30,
depending on their decisions and the decisions of their anonymous partner. Subjects were told to
report directly to either Room A or Room B. Room A subjects served as Investors, and Room B
subjects served as Stewards. A monitor was randomly chosen in each room after 10 subjects
arrived. Monitors received $5, in addition to their $10 show-up fee.
Five sessions were run. Each session consisted of nine pairs of subjects and two monitors.
The first session was the “No History” condition, in which subjects did not receive any financial
history from a previous experimental session. The other four sessions received a financial history
from the immediately preceding experimental session. The Appendix provides the instructions
for both investors and stewards, for both the non-history and history conditions. Table 1
summarizes the results for each of the nine pairs of subjects in each session.
Materials
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Each subject was given a consent form and set of instructions. The consent form
emphasized that (a) participation in the experiment will not affect participants’ relationship with
the University or affect their course grades, (b) participation is voluntary, (c) all data will remain
confidential, and (d) compensation consists of a payment for showing up plus or minus amounts
sent and received to anonymous counterparts in the experiment. The instructions were read aloud
by the experimenter.
Procedures
The appendix provides the instructions, including the procedures taken to assure
anonymity and confidentiality. Each subject performed the following steps:
A. Subjects were randomly assigned to report directly to either Room A or Room B. One
subject in each room was randomly selected to serve as a monitor (called Monitor A or
Monitor B, for Room A and Room B, respectively). Monitors verified that the
experimenters followed the experimental instructions.
B. Subjects read the consent form, were asked questions about the form, were given an
opportunity to ask questions about the form, and then signed the form if they wished to
participate in the experiment.
C. An experimenter in Room A read the experimental instructions out loud in Room A, and
another experimenter in Room B read the instructions out loud in Room B. Subjects in
both rooms were given hard copies of the instructions and were asked to read along
silently. Toward the end of the instructions, a summary financial history was given to all
but the first generation of players.
D. One at a time, Room A subjects (Investors) were called to a private area in Room A, were
randomly given an envelope containing $10, open the envelope, and decided whether to
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send all, some, or none of $10 to their Room B counterparts (Stewards). Room A subjects
put the amount of money they wish to send in an envelope and pocketed the rest. Room A
subjects also pocketed a specially marked key to be used later.
E. After all Room A subjects performed step D, the Room A monitor took the envelopes to
a recorder who was located in a hallway. The recorder recorded the amount sent and
tripled the investment. The Room B monitor was then called to bring the envelopes to
Room B, and Monitor A returned to Room B.
F. One at a time, Room B subjects were called to a private area in Room B, were randomly
given an envelope, opened the envelope, decided how much money to send back to their
counterpart in Room A, left that amount of money in the envelope, and pocketed the rest.
Afterward, each Room B subject was paid a $10 show-up fee and was asked to leave the
building.
G. The Room B monitor took the envelopes to the recorder in the hallway. At this time the
amounts sent back were recorded. The Room A monitor was called to put the envelopes
into mailboxes marked with letters corresponding to letters on the envelopes.
H. One at a time, Room A subjects went to Room C and opened the mailbox with a lettered
key corresponding to the letter on mailbox. After opening the appropriate mailbox, Room
A subjects took out the envelope, removed the money, and dropped the key in a box.
Afterward, Room A subjects were paid their $10 show-up fee and were then asked to
leave the building.
I. The monitors were paid $15 for their participation.
Results
Amounts Invested and Returned
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Participants in Session I have no history, while participants in Sessions II-V have
financial history because they have access to the results of prior sessions. H1 predicted that
investors would send nonzero amounts to stewards. The average amount invested ranged from
$4.67 in Session I to $7.00 in Session V (Table 1), with an overall average of $5.45. One-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate that in all five sessions, the amounts invested differed
significantly from zero with a one-sided p-value < 0.023. These results support H1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
H2 predicted that stewards who receive nonzero amounts will return nonzero amounts.
Therefore, in order to test H2 we removed observations where the stewards received $0. The
average amounts returned by stewards who received nonzero amounts increased monotonically
from $4.29 in session I (no history) to $9.38 in Session V (financial history), with an overall
average of $7.04 (Table 1). Excluding cases where stewards received $0, one-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests for amounts sent yielded one-sided p-values < 0.023 for all sessions other than
session I. In Session I, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test yielded a one-sided p-value of 0.174. The
latter results may be attributed to the relatively large number of Stewards who received positive
amounts but returned $0 in Session I. Overall, the results support H2.
Although we did not predict the effect of financial history on amounts sent and returned,
we did observe a successive increase in the amounts sent in three of the four financial history
conditions, and a successive increase in the amounts returned by Stewards in all four of the
financial history conditions. This pattern of results indicates that financial histories can have a
beneficial effect on societies, regardless of their impact on entropy.
Influence of Financial History on Entropy
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Investor behavior. H3 predicted that the introduction of financial history would reduce
the entropy of amounts sent by investors. Panel A of Table 2 lists the number of investors, by
amount invested and experimental session. Figure 1 displays histograms of the amounts invested,
by experimental session. A visual inspection of Figure 1 indicates that the introduction of a
financial history reduced the variance in the amounts invested across the experimental sessions,
where the amounts in Session I are more dispersed than in Session V. More formally,
Entropysession I = 2.503 and Entropysession V = 1.406, indicating a reduction in entropy of 1.098.
We used a bootstrapping technique to determine whether this Entropy reduction of 1.098 is
statistically significant. The null hypothesis for this test is that the investment amounts are
chosen randomly. We generated 10,000 measures of differences in entropy under this
assumption. Figure 2 displays the bootstrapping results. Based on the bootstrapped distribution,
the observed reduction in entropy is statistically significant (p < .01, one-tailed). These results
support H3, and are consistent with our entropy analysis of the Berg et al. (1995) data.
[Insert Table 2, Figure 1, and Figure 2 about here]
Steward behavior. Since the maximum amounts returned by stewards were constrained
by the tripled amounts sent by investors, we analyzed the entropy in the distributions of the
amounts returned by Stewards, in deciles of percentage of amounts received from Investors.
Panel B of Table 2 lists the number of stewards who returned, by deciles of percentages of
amounts received from investors and experimental session. The average amounts returned by
stewards as a percentage of amounts received from Sessions I - V are 23.8%, 36.6%, 41.45%,
43.1% and 41.25%, respectively. Figure 3 shows histograms of the amounts returned in deciles
of amounts received, for each of the five sessions. Unlike the Investor distributions in Figure 1,
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the Steward distributions in Figure 3 do not reveal a trend toward less variance across the five
sessions.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
More formally, Entropysession I = 1.379 and Entropysession V = 2.156, indicating a trend
toward more entropy (less order). We again used a bootstrapping technique to determine whether
the observed Entropy difference of 0. 777 is statistically significant. The null hypothesis for this
test is that the returned amounts are chosen randomly. We generated 10,000 measures of
differences in entropy under this assumption. Figure 4 displays the bootstrapping results. Based
on this bootstrapped distribution, session V has a higher rather than lower entropy than Session I
(one-tailed p > 0.5), contrary to H4. 4 This result also is contrary to our entropy analysis of the
Berg et al. (1995) Steward distributions. We conjecture that our result may be attributed to how
Session I exhibited more frequent zero amounts returned. The subsequent greater dispersion in
the amounts returned by Stewards in Sessions II – V resulted in an increase in entropy, but it also
indicates that a financial history yielded more trustworthy stewards. Consistent with this
interpretation, Berg et al. (1995, p. 132) speculated (citing Coleman, 1990) that the provision of a
financial history might enable Stewards to more easily identify with other investment game
participants, and thus trigger internalized social norms of trustworthiness.
Joint test of investor/steward behavior. We now examine the joint densities of Investor
and Steward behavior to test whether the observed clustering is statistically significant. Since
each session has the same sample size of 9, the effect of sample size on the entropy metric does
not arise in our setting. The entropy formula is as follows:
-ΣΣ (fi,j/N) Log2 (fi,j/N)
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where fi,j denotes the frequency in category “i,j.” For example, “3,2” denotes 3 dollars invested
and 2 returned by the steward and N represents the number of sample observations. Under this
metric, Entropysession I = 2.948 and Entropysession V = 2.750. We used a bootstrapping technique
to determine whether the observed Entropy reduction of 0.198 in the joint Investor/Steward
distributions from Session I to Session V is statistically significant. We created 10,000 draws of
the difference between entropies under the assumption that in both settings the observations were
just as likely to fall in one category as any other. This test indicates that the 0.198 reduction in
entropy is not significant at conventional levels (one-tailed p > 0.4). This result does not support
H5, and is contrary to the marginally significant reduction in entropy we observed in the Berg et
al. (1995) joint distributions.
General Discussion
This paper investigates whether the provision of financial transaction history will enable
successive generations of a laboratory society to increasingly organize themselves over time. We
operationally defined an increase in organization as a reduction in entropy of the distributions of
amounts invested and returned in an investment game. We used the Berg et al. (1995) data to
show that a report summarizing the financial transactions of a previous experimental session
significantly reduced entropy in the amounts sent by Investors and returned by Stewards. In
addition, the reduction in entropy of the joint distribution of amounts invested and returned in the
Berg et al. (1995) study was marginally significant. Our analysis of the Berg et al. (1995) data,
however, left two unanswered questions. First, can the entropy reduction results be
independently replicated in a new study? Second, do financial histories have an incremental
effect over subsequent generations? To provide answers, we gathered new data over five societal
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generations to test the predictive power of our hypothesis that financial histories provide a basis
for developing societal order.
If we assume that all agents are myopically self-interested and believe that all other
agents are similarly self-interested, then each Investor and Steward should “take the money and
run”, leaving no role for financial history in the evolution of society. In order for financial
history to play a role, the assumption of myopic self-interest needs to be relaxed. For example, if
each Investor is myopically self-interested but believes that his or her partner might not be, then
a financial history of past Investor-Steward behavior can tell Investors something about the
likely amount returned for each amount invested. Thus, financial histories also can influence the
amounts invested, and can influence the amounts returned if Stewards are not myopically selfinterested. For example, even though there are no contracts and there is no reputation building in
the Investment Game, past transaction data can give Stewards a basis to infer and mimic
expected or acceptable behavior.
Consistent with the prior investment game literature, our bootstrap analyses indicate that
in all five sessions the distributions of amounts sent by Investors differed significantly from zero.
Similarly, in four of five sessions the distributions of amounts returned by Stewards differed
significantly from zero. The entropy in the amounts sent by Investors declined significantly from
Session I to Session V, but the entropy did not decline significantly in the distributions of the
amounts returned by Stewards and in the joint Investor/Steward distributions. In contrast, our
entropy analyses of the Berg et al. (1995) data comparing their no history and financial history
conditions yielded significant entropy reductions in the Investor and Steward distributions, and a
marginally significant entropy reduction in the joint Investor/Steward distributions. This pattern
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of results across the two studies indicates that more research is needed to document the effects of
financial history across a variety of conditions.
Furthermore, entropy reduction is only one of several possible social outcomes that could
be mediated by financial histories. For example, as we observed in our data, financial histories
can yield more disperse but also more trustworthy Stewardship distributions in an Investment
Game setting, and the increase in Stewardship trustworthiness might in turn yield more trusting
Investors in subsequent generations. Ultimately, these iterative effects could yield greater overall
social wealth, despite lower entropy in the amounts returned by Stewards. More research is
needed, however, to test the robustness of financial histories’ mediating effects across a variety
of social settings. For example, variations of the single-period Investment Game could be used to
test the effects of financial history when Investors and Stewards participate in multiple sessions
and are allowed to communicate with one another (cf. Charness et al., 2011).
Finally, the provision of financial histories can be a conscious strategy that societal
agents use to structure their economic and social environments. But financial histories, like other
measurement systems, also can have unintended on organizations and societies (Cyert and
March, 1992; Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes, and Nahapiet, 1980; Thompson, 1967). While
the effects of financial histories might in some circumstances be mediated by the conscious
strategies of individual agents (cf. Berg et al., 1995, p. 134), financial histories also can structure
the behavior of subsequent generations without requiring agents to be consciously aware of these
effects (cf. Giddens, 1984). More research is needed to ascertain the extent to which the effect of
financial history is mediated by conscious versus unconscious individual perceptions and
decision strategies.
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Table 1. Amounts sent and returned, by experimental session. Investor averages include $0
amounts invested. Steward averages exclude observations where $0 was received.

Subject Pair
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Averages:

Session I
Sent
6
5
0
5
4
4
8
0
10
$4.67

Subject Pair
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Averages:

Session III
Sent
0
5
5
1
4
4
5
7
10
$4.56

Returned
0
8
10
1
5
0
8
7
15
$6.75

Session V
Sent
5
5
5
10
10
*
6
10
5
$7.00

Returned
0
3
10
13
15
*
9
20
5
$9.38

Subject Pair
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Averages:
* Missing data

Returned
0
10
0
0
0
4
16
0
0
$4.29
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Subject Pair
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Averages:

Session II
Sent
6
2
0
6
10
4
2
10
5
$5.00

Returned
9
1
0
3
12
5
1
5
15
$6.38

Subject Pair
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Averages:

Session IV
Sent
10
5
0
5
3
10
5
6
10
$6.00

Returned
0
8
0
10
0
21
15
5
8
$8.38

Table 2. Number of investors by amounts sent and returned, by experimental session.
Panel A. Number of investors, by experimental session and amount sent.
Amounts Sent
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Entropy

Session I
2
0
0
0
2
2
1
0
1
0
1
2.503

Session II
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
2
2.503

Session III
1
1
0
0
2
3
0
1
0
0
1
2.419

Session IV
1
0
0
1
0
3
1
0
0
0
3
2.113

Session V
0
0
0
0
0
4
1
0
0
0
3
1.406

Panel B. Number of stewards, by experimental session and amounts returned in deciles of
percentage of amounts received from investors. Observations where investors sent $0 are
excluded.
Deciles of
Percentage
0
(0%,10%]
(10%,20%]
(20%,30%]
(30%,40%]
(40%, 50%]
(50%, 60%]
(60%, 70%]
(70%, 80%]
(80%, 90%]
(90%, 100%]
Entropy

Session I
4
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
1.379

Session II
0
0
4
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
1.750

Session III
1
0
0
0
2
2
2
1
0
0
0
2.250
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Session IV
2
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
2.250

Session V
1
0
1
0
1
3
0
2
0
0
0
2.156

Figure 1. Amounts invested in each of the five sessions.

Session I

Session IV

Session II

Session V
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Session III

Figure 2. Bootstrapped distribution for amounts invested between session I and session V.

24

Figure 3. Amounts returned in each of the five sessions, in deciles of the percentage of amounts received.

Session I

Session IV

Session II

Session V
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Session III

Figure 4. Bootstrapped distribution for percentage amounts returned between session I and
session V.
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Figure 5. Bootstrapped distribution for the joint behavior between session I and session V.
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Appendix
Instructions for Room A
You have been asked to participate in a decision making study. I will read these instructions out
loud. Please do not talk among yourselves. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. I
will then answer your questions individually.

Overview
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different participant who is in another room.
You will not be told who these people are either during or after the experiment. This is Room A.
Other participants are in Room B. You will notice that there are other people in the same room
with you who are also participating in this experiment. You will not be paired with any of these
people.
One participant in Room A will be called Monitor A, and one participant in Room B will be
called Monitor B. Monitor A and Monitor B will be randomly chosen before the experiment
begins. The monitors will be in charge of the envelopes as explained below. The monitors also
will verify that the instructions have been followed. Monitors will be given $15 at the end of the
experiment.
Each participant in Room B who is not a monitor will be given $10 for showing up on time and
participating until the end of the experiment. Each participant in Room A will receive $10 in an
envelope. Each Room A participant will then have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of
the $10 to a participant in Room B. Each dollar sent to Room B will be tripled. For example, if a
participant in Room A sends an envelope containing $2, he or she will keep the remaining $8 and
the envelope will contain $6 when it reaches Room B. If a participant in Room A sends an
envelope containing $9, he or she will keep the remaining $1 and the envelope will contain $27
when it reaches Room B. The participant in Room B will then decide how much money to send
back to the participant in Room A.
[For the financial history treatment we added the following paragraph: Each of you has received
a report summarizing the decisions of subjects who participated in a previous experiment. Please
check the last page of the instructions to be sure you have this sheet.]

Confidentiality
This experiment is designed so that no one, including the experimenters and monitors, will know
the decisions of any individual participants in Room A or Room B. Since your decision is
private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
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How the Experiment is Run
Room A participant decisions. The experiment is conducted as follows. Twelve large unmarked
envelopes have been placed in a box in Room A. Each of these envelopes contains 10 one dollar
bills, a smaller inner envelope, and a key in a sealed envelope marked “KEY”. The inner
envelope and key are both marked with the same letter of the alphabet. The Room A monitor will
randomly select and hand each participant in Room A an unmarked envelope from the box. Each
Room A participant will perform the following steps:
1. Privately open the unmarked envelope. The participant who opens the envelope will be
the only person who knows which letter of the alphabet was in the envelope.
2. Leave the envelope marked “KEY” unopened until instructed to open it later in the
experiment.
3. Privately decide how many dollar bills to put into the inner envelope, and then put those
dollar bills in the inner envelope.
4. Privately pocket any remaining dollar bills and pocket the unopened envelope marked
“KEY”.
5. Privately put the inner envelope back inside the large unmarked envelope.
6. Raise his or her hand. When Monitor A comes by, return the unmarked envelope to the
box marked “return the envelopes here”.
Recording and processing of Room A envelopes. As soon as all Room A envelopes have been
put into the return box, Monitor A will transport the box to a recorder who is sitting in the
hallway. With Monitor A observing, the recorder will perform the following steps:
1. Take all unmarked envelopes out of the box.
2. Take an inner envelope out of an unmarked envelope, one at a time.
3. On a blank sheet of paper, record the letter that is printed on the envelope and the amount
of money in the envelope.
4. Triple the amount of money in the inner envelope, place the inner envelope back into the
unmarked outer envelope, and place the unmarked outer envelope back in the box.
5. After all of the envelopes have been processed in this manner, the recorder will signal
Monitor B to come to the recorder’s desk. Once Monitor B has arrived, Monitor A will be
asked to return to Room A.
Room B participant decisions. Monitor B will carry the box of envelopes to Room B. Monitor B
then will randomly select and hand each participant in Room B an unmarked envelope from the
box. Each Room B participant will perform the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Decide how many dollar bills to leave in the inner envelope.
Pocket any remaining dollar bills.
Place the inner envelope in the unmarked outer envelope.
Raise his or her hand. When Monitor B comes by, return the outer envelope to the box
marked “return envelopes here”.
5. Gather his or her belongings, receive his or her $10 compensation for participating in the
experiment, and be asked to leave the building.
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Recording and processing of Room B envelopes. After all envelopes in Room B are returned to
the box marked “return the envelopes here” and all Room B participants have been asked to
leave the building, Monitor B will transport the box to the recorder in the hallway. With Monitor
B observing, the recorder will perform the following steps:
1. Take all unmarked envelopes out of the box.
2. Take an inner envelope out of an unmarked envelope, one at a time.
3. Record on a blank sheet of paper the letter on the envelope and the amount of money in
the envelope.
4. Place the inner envelope in the box.
5. After all of the envelopes have been processed in this manner, the recorder will then
signal Monitor A to come to the recorder’s desk.
Once Monitor A has arrived, Monitor B will return to Room B. When Monitor A arrives,
Monitor A and the recorder will carry the box of envelopes to room C. Room C contains locking
boxes with identifying letters. The letters correspond to the letters on the inner envelopes. While
the recorder observes, Monitor A will place each inner envelope in the box with the
corresponding letter. All of the boxes will then be locked. The recorder will then return to the
hallway and Monitor A will return to Room A.
Room A participants privately open the returned envelopes. Monitor A will then point to one
participant in Room A at a time to proceed to Room C. When called to go to Room C, each
Room A participant will perform the following steps:
1. Gather all of his her belongings since he or she will be asked to leave the building when
done.
2. Enter Room C alone.
3. Open the envelope marked “KEY”. Inside this envelope is a lettered key which will open
the locked box with the corresponding letter. The inner envelope in the box is the same
envelope that Room A participant started with.
4. Go to the appropriate locked box, open it, take out the envelope, and remove the money.
5. Return the empty envelope to the box.
6. Lock the box.
7. Return the key to the envelope marked “KEY”.
8. Drop the envelope marked “KEY” in the box just outside the door in the hallway and be
asked to leave the building.
Conclusion of experiment. After everyone in Room A has left, the experiment is over and the
two monitors will be paid $15 for their participation.

Note about Dollar Bills. We will use e-dollars for this experiment. At the end of the experiment,
your e-dollars will be converted into real dollars at a faceless teller. The conversion rate is one
dollar for one e-dollar bill.
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Instructions for Room B
You have been asked to participate in a decision making study. I will read these instructions out
loud. Please do not talk among yourselves. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. I
will then answer your questions individually.

Overview
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different participant who is in another room.
You will not be told who these people are either during or after the experiment. This is Room B.
Other participants are in Room A. You will notice that there are other people in the same room
with you who are also participating in this experiment. You will not be paired with any of these
people.
One participant in Room A will be called Monitor A, and one participant in Room B will be
called Monitor B. Monitor A and Monitor B will be randomly chosen before the experiment
begins. The monitors will be in charge of the envelopes as explained below. The monitors also
will verify that the instructions have been followed. Monitors will be given $15 at the end of the
experiment.
Each participant in Room B who is not a monitor will be given $10 for showing up on time and
participating until the end of the experiment. Each participant in Room A will receive $10 in an
envelope. Each Room A participant will then have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of
the $10 to a participant in Room B. Each dollar sent to Room B will be tripled. For example, if a
participant in Room A sends an envelope containing $2, he or she will keep the remaining $8 and
the envelope will contain $6 when it reaches Room B. If a participant in Room A sends an
envelope containing $9, he or she will keep the remaining $1 and the envelope will contain $27
when it reaches Room B. The participant in Room B will then decide how much money to send
back to the participant in Room A.
[For the financial history treatment we added the following paragraph: Each of you has received
a report summarizing the decisions of subjects who participated in a previous experiment. Please
check the last page of the instructions to be sure you have this sheet.]

Confidentiality
This experiment is designed so that no one, including the experimenters and monitors, will know
the decisions of any individual participants in Room A or Room B. Since your decision is
private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision either during or after the experiment.
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How the Experiment is Run
Room A participant decisions. The experiment is conducted as follows. Twelve large unmarked
envelopes have been placed in a box in Room A. Each of these envelopes contains 10 one dollar
bills, a smaller inner envelope, and a key in a sealed envelope marked “KEY”. The inner
envelope and key are both marked with the same letter of the alphabet. The Room A monitor will
randomly select and hand each participant in Room A an unmarked envelope from the box. Each
Room A participant will perform the following steps:
1. Privately open the unmarked envelope. The participant who opens the envelope will be
the only person who knows which letter of the alphabet was in the envelope.
2. Leave the envelope marked “KEY” unopened until instructed to open it later in the
experiment.
3. Privately decide how many dollar bills to put into the inner envelope, and then put those
dollar bills in the inner envelope.
4. Privately pocket any remaining dollar bills and pocket the unopened envelope marked
“KEY”.
5. Privately put the inner envelope back inside the large unmarked envelope.
6. Raise his or her hand. When Monitor A comes by, return the unmarked envelope to the
box marked “return the envelopes here”.
Recording and processing of Room A envelopes. As soon as all Room A envelopes have been
put into the return box, Monitor A will transport the box to a recorder who is sitting in the
hallway. With Monitor A observing, the recorder will perform the following steps:
1. Take all unmarked envelopes out of the box.
2. Take an inner envelope out of an unmarked envelope, one at a time.
3. On a blank sheet of paper, record the letter that is printed on the envelope and the amount
of money in the envelope.
4. Triple the amount of money in the inner envelope, place the inner envelope back into the
unmarked outer envelope, and place the unmarked outer envelope back in the box.
5. After all of the envelopes have been processed in this manner, the recorder will signal
Monitor B to come to the recorder’s desk. Once Monitor B has arrived, Monitor A will be
asked to return to Room A.
Room B participant decisions. Monitor B will carry the box of envelopes to Room B. Monitor B
then will randomly select and hand each participant in Room B an unmarked envelope from the
box. Each Room B participant will perform the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Decide how many dollar bills to leave in the inner envelope.
Pocket any remaining dollar bills.
Place the inner envelope in the unmarked outer envelope.
Raise his or her hand. When Monitor B comes by, return the outer envelope to the box
marked “return envelopes here”.
5. Gather his or her belongings, receive his or her $10 compensation for participating in the
experiment, and be asked to leave the building.
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Recording and processing of Room B envelopes. After all envelopes in Room B are returned to
the box marked “return the envelopes here” and all Room B participants have been asked to
leave the building, Monitor B will transport the box to the recorder in the hallway. With Monitor
B observing, the recorder will perform the following steps:
1. Take all unmarked envelopes out of the box.
2. Take an inner envelope out of an unmarked envelope, one at a time.
3. Record on a blank sheet of paper the letter on the envelope and the amount of money in
the envelope.
4. Place the inner envelope in the box.
5. After all of the envelopes have been processed in this manner, the recorder will then
signal Monitor A to come to the recorder’s desk.
Once Monitor A has arrived, Monitor B will return to Room B. When Monitor A arrives,
Monitor A and the recorder will carry the box of envelopes to room C. Room C contains locking
boxes with identifying letters. The letters correspond to the letters on the inner envelopes. While
the recorder observes, Monitor A will place each inner envelope in the box with the
corresponding letter. All of the boxes will then be locked. The recorder will then return to the
hallway and Monitor A will return to Room A.
Room A participants privately open the returned envelopes. Monitor A will then point to one
participant in Room A at a time to proceed to Room C. When called to go to Room C, each
Room A participant will perform the following steps:
1. Gather all of his her belongings since he or she will be asked to leave the building when
done.
2. Enter Room C alone.
3. Open the envelope marked “KEY”. Inside this envelope is a lettered key which will open
the locked box with the corresponding letter. The inner envelope in the box is the same
envelope that Room A participant started with.
4. Go to the appropriate locked box, open it, take out the envelope, and remove the money.
5. Return the empty envelope to the box.
6. Lock the box.
7. Return the key to the envelope marked “KEY”.
8. Drop the envelope marked “KEY” in the box just outside the door in the hallway and be
asked to leave the building.
Conclusion of experiment. After everyone in Room A has left, the experiment is over and the
two monitors will be paid $15 for their participation.
Note about Dollar Bills. We will use e-dollars for this experiment. At the end of the experiment,
your e-dollars will be converted into real dollars at a faceless teller. The conversion rate is one
dollar for one e-dollar.
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Footnotes
1

In the investment games reported in Berg et al. (1995), all subjects were given a $10 show-up

fee. Subjects in Room B pocketed their show-up fee. Unlike in our experiment, the Berg et al.
(1995) subjects in Room A did not receive an additional $10 and instead decided how much of
their $10 show-up fee to send to their anonymous counterpart in Room B.
2

Entropy also varies with the number of possible outcomes. For example, a fair die has entropy

equal to 2.58 and thus has less order than a fair coin. Accordingly, our entropy metric takes
sample size into account.
3

Specifically, in the No History condition there are at most 32 distinct observations. This means

the maximum level of entropy will be -Log2(1/32) = 5.0. In contrast, if there were only 28
observations, the maximum entropy would be -Log2(1/28) = 4.8.
4

Pairwise entropy differences between Sessions II - V are not significant at conventional levels.
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